UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

HEATH VINCENT FULKERSON,

Plaintiff

v.

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STATE OF NEVADA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendants

Case No.: 3:20-cv-00419-RCJ-WGC

Report & Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge

Re: ECF Nos. 1, 1-1

This Report and Recommendation is made to the Honorable Robert C. Jones, United States District Judge. The action was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and the Local Rules of Practice, LR 1B 1-4.

Plaintiff has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) (ECF No. 1) and prose complaint (ECF No. 1-1).

I. IFP APPLICATION

A person may be granted permission to proceed IFP if the person "submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses [and] that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that the person is entitled to redress." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 applies to all actions filed IFP, not just prisoner actions).

The Local Rules of Practice for the District of Nevada provide: "Any person who is unable to prepay the fees in a civil case may apply to the court for authority to proceed [IFP].

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The application must be made on the form provided by the court and must include a financial affidavit disclosing the applicant's income, assets, expenses, and liabilities." LSR 1-1.

"[T]he supporting affidavits [must] state the facts as to [the] affiant's poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty." U.S. v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A litigant need not "be absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefits of the statute." Adkins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948).

A review of the application to proceed IFP reveals Plaintiff cannot pay the filing fee; therefore, the application should be granted.

II. SCREENING

A. Standard

"[T]he court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-- (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal-- (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A), (B)(i)-(iii).

Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks that language. As such, when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint under this statute, the court applies the same standard as is applied under Rule 12(b)(6). See e.g. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) ("The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim."). Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 23 | 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

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The court must accept as true the allegations, construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (citations omitted). Allegations in pro se complaints are "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]" Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A complaint must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "The pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." *Id.* (citation and quotation marks omitted). At a minimum, a plaintiff should include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Id.* at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

A dismissal should not be without leave to amend unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the action is frivolous and could not be amended to state a federal claim, or the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 16|| 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995); O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990).

B. Plaintiff's Complaint

Plaintiff's complaint names the State of Nevada Office of the Attorney General. Plaintiff alleges that he was served with a felony complaint on or around July 2, 2020, which he claims contains frivolous and false charges of theft and insurance fraud. He further avers that the service of the complaint was by an Officer of the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police Department, and was therefore illegal. Plaintiff attaches a copy of the criminal complaint, which charges Plaintiff with insurance fraud and theft.

Preliminarily, the State of Nevada and a governmental agency that is an arm of the state,

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no occasion to opine on what the elements of a constitutional malicious prosecution action under § 1983 are or how they may differ from those of a fabricated-evidence claim"); Manuel v. City of 11 Joliet, III, 137 S.Ct. 911, 921-22 (2017); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390 n. 2 (2007) ("We 13 have never explored the contours of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution suit under § 14 | 1983, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1994) (plurality), and we do not do so

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such as the Attorney General's Office, is not a person for purposes of section 1983. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Doe v. Lawrence *Livermore Nat'l Lab.*, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, it appears that Plaintiff is attempting to assert a malicious prosecution claim insofar as he asserts that the Attorney General's Office has brought false charges against him.

The Supreme Court has declined to decide whether a malicious prosecution claim is cognizable

under section 1983. McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149, 2156 n. 3 (2019) ("this case provides

15|| here."). The Ninth Circuit has not expressly weighed in on the issue, but implicitly recognized such a claim in Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). There, the court stated that to prevail on this claim, the plaintiff "must show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection of another specific constitutional right." Id. Most federal appellate courts have also recognized a malicious prosecution claim under section 1983. 22|| See, e.g., Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d 494 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Britton v. Maloney, 196 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 1999); Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2013); Johnson v. Knorr,

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477 F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 2007); Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 646 n. 2 (4th Cir. 2012), cert denied, 134 S.Ct. 98 (Oct. 7, 2013) and 134 S.Ct. 617 (Nov. 12, 2013); Sykes v. Andeson, 625 F.3d 294, 308-09 (6th Cir. 2010); Novitsky v. Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2007); Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003).

The Supreme Court noted the common law elements of the tort of malicious prosecution: "a defendant instigated a criminal proceeding with improper purpose and without probable cause" and the proceedings have terminated in favor of the accused. See McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149, 2156 (2019) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653). Assuming that such a claim is cognizable, the Supreme Court held that it accrues only once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in the malicious prosecution plaintiff's (i.e., criminal defendant's) favor. McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149, 2156 (2019) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 12||477, 483 (1994)).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the criminal proceeding has terminated in his favor. Therefore, even if he sued a proper defendant, such a claim has not yet accrued.

It is also appropriate for the court to abstain from this civil case where there is an ongoing state court criminal proceeding. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff argues that service of the criminal complaint was not proper, that is something he should raise directly in the criminal case.

For these reasons, it is recommended that this action should be dismissed. The dismissal should be without prejudice in the event Plaintiff can allege that the underlying criminal proceeding has terminated in his favor and can sue a proper defendant; however, this action should be administratively closed.

III. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge enter an order:

- (1) **GRANTING** Plaintiff's IFP application (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff is permitted to maintain this action without prepaying the filing fee or giving security therefor. This order granting IFP status does not extend to the issuance of subpoenas at government expense.
- (2) The complaint (ECF No. 1-1) should be **FILED**.
- (3) The action should be **DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE**, and the action should administratively closed.

The Plaintiff should be aware of the following:

- 1. That he may file, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. These objections should be titled "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation" and should be accompanied by points and authorities for consideration by the district judge.
- 2. That this Report and Recommendation is not an appealable order and that any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of judgment by the district court.

Dated: August 18, 2020

Willem G. Cobb

William G. Cobb United States Magistrate Judge

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